- role of unconventional forces/insurgents in warfare; role of special operations forces in conventional order of battle
- 1st Gen 1648-1860, 2nd Gen 1860-1918, 3rd Gen 1918-2003
- 4th Gen: non-state actors, informal combatants in small cells, use of any available means, exploit all state vulnerabilities to undermine enemy, focus on culture/religion, "larger" goals than guerrilla warfare
- Mao: armed propaganda, protracted war, climactic offensive; political over military, organization, self-reliance
- Guevara: "Foco" (vanguard revolutionary cadre) to focus popular discontent; military and party as one, focus on direct action, no fixed base, military has priority
- Kilcullen, Galula, Petraeus, Clausewitz, Trinquier, McCuen, Thompson
- McCuen: hearts and minds, civil over military
- Thompson (1963): clear political objectives, rule of law, whole of government approach, undermine insurgent support, secure base areas
- Galula: population over territory, engage the friendly minority to secure the neutrality of the majority, protect the population to give them the freedom to cooperate, clear then hold/secure then build infrastructure then repeat in adjacent region
- Kilcullen: COIN force may be the "revolutionary", conflict ethnography, 80% non-kinetic, engage the women, armed social work
Alliances:
- Delian/Peloponnesian Leagues, NATo/Warsaw Pact, Triple Entente/Triple Alliance, Axis and Allies; Melian Dialogue
- collective security vs. collective defense (CD = alliances)
- collective security: each state shares responsibility for internal/member security against the other members; interest of all members involved
- collective defense: against an outside aggressor; Thucydides: "Mutual fear is the most solid basis on which to organize an alliance."
- offensive or defensive; wartime or peacetime; bilateral or multilateral; guarantee pact or mutal assistance agreement; institutionalize or not
Deterrence:
- broad/narrow, central/extended, general/immediate, punishment/denial
- communications, capability, credibility
- undermiens enemy's values/interests; defense balances/exceeds enemy strengths; deterrence based on enemy's perception, not on deterrer's actions
- first strike vs. second strike vs. BMD
- new US triad: 1) all strike capabilities, including conventional; 2) passive and active defense, including BMD; 3) "robust infrastructure" to undergird strike and defense
- deterrence ("Hey, don't do that!") vs. compellance ("Hey, stop doing that!")
- based on lack of defensive measures against massive nuclear bombardment
- mutual destruction uncomfortable as a status quo, but efforts to escape this situation undermine deterrence
- "Killing people is good, killing weapons is bad." - John Newhouse
Arms Control:
- Kellogg-Briand Pact, SALT, START, Hague, Geneva, PTBT/CBT/NPT, Iraq 1991-2003; interwar experience influence on SALT/START negotiations
- dual use vs. disarmament; trust/verification difficult, CBMs
- arms races result from political disputes, not vice versa
- structural = numbers, operational = regional prohibitions + CBMs
- common interest in moderation necessary FOR arms control, but that common interest undermines the NEED for arms control; arms control arises from deterrence
- Soviet perspective (continuation of revolutionary struggle) vs. Western (detente/reduction of the risk of nuclear war); Soviet efforts to use arms control to manipulate regional NATO partnerships (Central Europe, Scandinavia)
- National Technical Means vs. on-site inspections (trust/verification)
- handling safety vs. test bans; what if SALT happened in the 1950's? more advanced/accurate doesn't necessarily mean worse
- "The rigidity you legislate today may deny you the evasive maneuver you want to take tomorrow." - Laurence Martin
Reith Lecture 1981 #6:
- security community: Western Europe, Canada/US vs. Finland/USSR
- countervailing power vs. harmonious purpose as basis for peace
- detente as both a source and consequence of security
- concensus on "outputs" of security, vice "inputs", to produce common will
- cheap and dangerous nuclear solutions in lieu of expensive and appropriate conventional ones
- security compared to electricity
IR Theory:
Realism: self-interested states compete for power and security; states, which behave similarly regardless of government type; military power and state diplomacy
Liberalism: peace strengthened by democracy, economic links, and international organization; states, international institutions, commerical interests; international institutions and global commerce
Idealism: ideas, values, culture shape, international politics; promoters of new ideas, transnational networks, NGOs; ideas and values
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